I’ve long waited for a book that explored the foreign policy differences between the two Bush administrations. The first President Bush presided over an almost flawless policy in what could very well have been the most dangerous period since the end of the Second World War. In my view, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union was more fraught with peril than even the post-9/11 world.If not for the steady hand of George H.W Bush and his team, the end of European communism could very well have exploded into military conflict, civil war, or both. Because of the danger of both massive refugee migration from Eastern Europe and the USSR and control of the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear arsenals, American and NATO engagement might well have been necessary.
Because Bush didn’t celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall in an overly public way, as many in the Republican Party demanded he do, the Soviets didn’t react by attempting to militarily maintain the hold on their satellites and the Soviet Union itself.
When the history in written with the full perspective of time, I believe that first Bush’s foreign policies will judged favourably, in a league with Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower’s as the among the greatest of the Twentieth century. Its greatness lies in what didn’t happen, but could have. That makes it harder to appreciate in the near-term.
The foreign policy of his son couldn’t have been more starkly different. Where the father was a realist of the Kissinger school, the son was an idealist, more closely aligned in policy terms with Woodrow Wilson than any president in his party. The father believed that democracy was preferable to the alternatives, but the son believed it was necessary and something to be demanded, regardless of regional or historical circumstances. On Iraq, the father was a proponent of containment while the son championed regime change. As the father left office, the position of the United States in the world had improved. As the son returned to Texas, America’s position was immeasurably worse.
A number of people served both presidents – a surprisingly large number given the policy differences between the father and son – but none have yet written their memoirs. Richard Haass is the first. And I can’t recommend War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars enough to students of US foreign policy.
Currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Haass served as a senior aide to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in the first Bush White House and as the Director of Policy Planning the Colin Powell’s state department in the second. His perspective of the two from relatively close proximity is an invaluable resource for future historians.
Being a senior member of the NSC staff, Haass was closely involved in the lead-up to the first Gulf War, which he describes as a “war of necessity.” During the second war, which is termed a “war of choice,” Haass, as a member of Powell’s circle, was frozen out of the deliberations and creation of policy. Accordingly, the section of the book dedicated to the Iraq War is much less detailed as a study of actual history. It’s more of a treatise on lessons learned and mistakes made.
The gem of the book is the first half, dedicated to the Gulf War. The respect and admiration Haass feels for the personalities in the first Bush administration is palpable in the pages of War of Necessity, War of Choice. The portrait of those that went on to serve in the son’s administration and the way that they changed is fascinating.
The gem of the book is the first half, dedicated to the Gulf War. The respect and admiration Haass feels for the personalities in the first Bush administration is palpable in the pages of War of Necessity, War of Choice. The portrait of those that went on to serve in the son’s administration and the way that they changed is fascinating.
Mr. Haass details how figures like Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz changed between administrations. What seems to be the lesson is that strong personalities can be restrained by a strong president. That the lunacy of Dick Cheney wasn’t revealed earlier might best be explained by the fact that he was countered by Gerald Ford, George H.W Bush, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft , James Baker and Colin Powell explains why he was such a successfully staffer. In the second Bush administration, Cheney only had to answer to an unsure president, who had only ever held a constitutionally weak office before becoming commander-in chief.
Haass hypothesizes that the neocons in the second Bush administration didn’t fundamentally change over the course of a decade. Rather, their instincts were successfully countered in the first Bush White House. The Iraq War could not have happened the way it did under George H.W Bush, just as it couldn’t have under Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford or Reagan. It was an action specific to the administration of George W. Bush
While that’s not the main thrust of War of Necessity, War of Choice, it might be the most important lesson: the importance of a self-assured president surrounded by capable, experienced staff. But the importance of the president himself controlling policy is paramount.
Perhaps the most prophetic thing in War of Necessity, War of Choice is a conversation Haass had with the former CIA director, Richard Helms at the end of the latter’s life.
Helms said that he had spent most of his adult life overthrowing governments, and he knew that you had to have something to replace the government you overthrow with.
“I hope you know what you’re doing,” he concluded. If anything, that’s the difference between the war of necessity and the war of choice described in Richard Haass' book.
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